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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
F,EDERATED SE·CURITY
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff and Apellant,
vs.
ISAAC ORSE,N BURTON, aka Orsen
Burton; and HORACE J.
KNOWLTON,
Defendants and Respondent.

Case
No.

10135

APPEILLANT'S BRIEF

STATE~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This action now involves only a counterclaim by
defendant Horace J. Knowlton. The appeal involves
plaintiff's right to a dis1nissal of the counterclaim under
Rule 37(b}(~) (iii), U.R.C.P., and, necessarily, the questions whether, after entering an order of dislnissal, the
district court acted properly (1) in considering a pleading filed by defendant Knowlton after the entry of the
dismissal; ( 2) in treating the pleading as a motion for
nt=-w trial: and (3) in setting aside its order of dismissal.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The district court dismissed defendant Knowlton's
counterclaim for his failure to comply with an order
compelling discovery under Rule 37(a), U.R.C.P. Defendant Knowlton thereafter filed a pleading styled
"Objections to Order of Dismissal" on which the district
court held a hearing and considered as a motion for new
trial under Rule 59, U.R.C.P. The district court denied
plaintiff's motion of strike the pleading and thereafter
set aside its order of dismissal.
RELIE.F SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the district
court denying plaintiff's motion to strike and setting
aside the order of dismissal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts giving rise to this appeal are rather involved. For purposes of clarity the parties will be
referred to as they appeared in the district court. Plaintiff brought an action against defendants Isaac Orsen
Burton and Horace J. Knowlton to determine disputed
ownership of a certain certificate representing shares
of plaintiff's common capital stock. Defendant Knowlton
filed a counterclaim alleging that certain commissions
were due him from plaintiff for sales of insurance policies and sales of stock, and alleging plaintiff made certain
improper charges against his account. On November
9, 1962, consideration of the complaint and the counter-
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elaim of <.lPfendant l(nowlton were separated by the
eourt, and on N ove1nber 13, 1962, summary judgment
was entered ruling that defendant Burton had no claim
agai11st plaintiff for issuance of its stock and dismissing
plaintiff's complaint against defendant Knowlton. (R.
30). This left as the only matter for disposition in the
ease the counterclaim of defendant Knowlton. The term
"defPndant" will hereafter be used to describe only the
d(-t'end.ant l{nowlton.
Pursuant to Rule 33, U.R.C.P., plaintiff served intPrrogatories upon defendant on June 13, 1962. (R. 1, 2,).
These interrogatories sought information as to the details
and basis of defendant's claim in order to enable plaintiff
to prepare a defense. On October 17, 1962, defendant
Knowlton served purported answers to the interrogatorit'S which failed to contain the information asked
for by plaintiff. (R. 3, 4). Defendant claimed the information regarding his claim was all in plaintiff's exclu::;iye possession. Thereafter on April18, 1962 defendant
filed supplen1t>ntal answers to plaintiff's interrogatories
whieh. although 14 pages long, still failed to provide the
information sought by plaintiff in its interrogatories.
(R. 3-18). These supplemental answers were vague
as to subject matter and, as an example, contained the
names of 413 families and made reference to a list of
SL'Yeral hundred more. (R. 7-12, 17). However, they
failed to adequately state the basis and details of defendanfs claim as to the families listed.
Because of the evasiveness and insufficiency of the
answers plaintiff 'Yas unable to prepare its defense, and
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moved the court for an order under Rule 37(a), U.R.C.P.
requiring defendant to make discovery by providing the
information sought in plaintiff's interrogatories. (R. 19).
The court held seven or eight hearings to determine what
information defendant fairly had available to him and
what information he should be required to produce to
satisfy plaintiff's interrogatories. (R. 30). As a result
of these hearings the court found that the defendant had
substantially all of the information sought by plaintiff
through statements which had been provided monthly by
plaintiff and other information available to him. (R. 31).
However, to fully explore the question the court ordered
plaintiff to produce evidence on a sampling of the items
claimed by defendant to determine whether, under all
of the circumstances, defendant should be required to
make full and complete discovery. The court found that:
"A sampling of items relied upon by defendant and portrayed to the court by answers under
oath by plaintiff indicated to the court that defendant, by his counter-claim, was on a fishing
trip, only, at plaintiff's expense." (R. 31).
Nevertheless the court permitted defendant to select one
item under his claim which he felt showed the greatest
possible merit. The court on that point found:
"Defendant, thereupon, selected an item of
$.6,180.00, represented by a check and set out as
No.(1) in plaintiff's Answers of April 18, 1963.
The court then required plaintiff to submit and
portray by evidence the complete accounting of
all transactions relating to this item. Mter day's
hearing relative thereto, with evidence upon the
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books and reeords of plaintiff company, defendant
withdrew his claiin admitting that he had no
claim, whatever, based upon said check." (R. 31).
After nunwrous hearings, the court on July 26, 1963
enti•n·d an order pursuant to Rule 37 (a), U.R.C.P., under
which it ordered the defendant to provide plaintiff with
the following infonnation relating to his claim on or
bi•t'ore August 2~, 19G3:
Hl. Copes of the contracts with plaintiff
upon which he relies in asserting his Counter
Clai1n, including the schedules of cominissions on
eaeh such contract.

2. The policy numbers for each policy for
which he 1nakes claim, and if he cannot designate
said policy nun1bers then the name of the insured
and the date upon which said policy was issued
for which he makes claiin.
3. The nature, basis and amount of his claim
with regard to each specific policy and the date
upon which each claim originally arose.

±. A designation as to each policy for which
clain1 is made of the contract and commission
schedule under which claim is made." (R. 19·, 20).
Defendant failed to provide plaintiff with the information indicated in the court's order, and on August
~ti. 19G3, plaintiff filed a n1otion to dismiss defendant's
eounterclailn pursuant to Rule 37 (b) and Rule 41 (b) and
(c), F.R.C.P. On September 6, 19·63, defendant filed
"Defendant's ~-\.nswer in Response to Order," but except
for answer X o. 1 the Answers failed to provide the information required by the order. (R. 22, 23).
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The court held a hearing on plaintiff's motion to
dismiss the counterclaim of defendant Knowlton for failure to comply with Rule 37, U.R.C.P., and on November
12, 19·6.3, the court entered its memorandum decision concluding that the counterclaim of defendant Knowlton
should be dismissed under Rule 37(b) (2}(iii), U.R.C.P.
(R. 30, 31, 32).
Pursuant to the memorandum decision the order of
dismissal was entered November 14, 1963, dis1nissing
with prejudice the defendant's counterclaim. (R. 33). On
November 25, 19·63, defendant Knowlton filed a pleading
titled "Defendant's Objections to Order of Dismissal."
(R. 34, 35). The substance of ''Defendant's Objections to
Order of Dismissal'' constitutes a repetition of certain
specific and some general claims defendant set forth in
his counterclaim. On December 12, 196·3, plaintiff filed
a Motion to Strike "Defendant's Objections to Order of
Dismissal." (R. 36, 37). Hearing was held on "Defendant's Objections to Order of Disnrissal" and plaintiff's
motion to strike, and thereafter on ~,1arch 20, 1964, the
court, treating the pleading as a motion for a new trial,
entered its supplemental 1nemorandum decision setting
aside the order of disnrissal and denying plaintiff's motion to strike. ( R. 38). Fron1 this decision plaintiff has
appealed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE "DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO ORDER
OF DISMISSAL" SINCE THE PLEADING ENTITLED "DE-
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F'ENDANT'S OBJECTION TO ORDER OF DISMISSAL" IS
BEYOND THE SCOPE PERMITTED BY UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND WAS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE
THE COURT.

The court erred in denying plaintiff's Motion to
Strike defendant's pleading entitled "Defendant's ObjPdion to Order of Disn1issal." Since such pleading in
titlf', fonn and substance (R.. 3'±, 35) is beyond the scope
pertnittt>d by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
could not properly be considered by the court.
Rule 7(b) (1), U.R.C.P., provides:
":Motions. An application to the court for
an order shall be made by motion which, unless
n1adP during a hearing or trial, shall be made
in writing, shall state with particularity the
grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief
or order sought. The requirement of writing is
fulfilled if the motion is stated in written notice
of the hearing of the motion."
The pleading which the defendant entitled "D·efendant's
ObjPetions to Order of Dismissal" fails to fulfill any of
the requirements of Rule 7(b) (1). The court regarded
the pleading as a motion for a new trial under Rule 59,
U.R.C.P., (R. 38). However, such a motion is subject
to the requiren1ents of Rule 7(b) (1), and an examination
of the pleading (R. 34, 35) and an application of its
~ubstance to the requirement to Rule 7 (b) (1) clearly
show that the pleading can not be construed a motion in
any 1nanner and its form is not that required by a motion.
The substance of the pleading fails to state with particularity the grounds therefore and fails to set forth the
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relief (')r order sought as required by Rule 7 (b), U.R.C.P.
Although the Rules of Procedure are liberally construed
by the court to permit the substance of a pleading to
prevail over the form, to constitute a motion the pleading
must set forth the grounds on which its rests and the
relief or order sought. The pleading is so vague and
uncertain in its substance it cannot be said to set forth
grounds supporting a motion. Further, in no place
or manner does the pleading state the relief or order
sought.
In the case of Howard v. Howard, 11 U. (2d) 149,
356 P.2d 275, the Supreme Court applied the rule of
liberal construction to a pleading claimed to be motion
for a new trial. Even under the holding of the H award
case the "Defendant's Objections to Order. of Dismissal"
cannot be brought within the purvue of Rule 7(b) (1).
In that case the pleading was denominated a notice of
intention to file a motion for a new trial, but the court
pointed out that in the body of the pleading it was termed
"Motion." The pleading in that case clearly showed the
relief or order sought and the grounds therefore. Further, the pleading met the requirements of Rule 59(a),
U.R.C.P., in that it set forth the grounds required by
subparagraph (1) of Rule 59(a) U.R.C.P., supported
by an attached affidavit, as required by Rule 59(c),
U.R.C.P., and stated the ground provided in subparagraph (7) of Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P. The court found that
pleading in substance requested a new trial. However,
the defendant's pleading in the instant case does not
meet any of the requirements of Rule 7(h) (1), U.R.C.P.

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

or Rule 5D, lT.R.C.P. as set forth in the Rules and as con~t nwd in thP II oward decision.
SirwP tlwn• is no other Rule under which defendant's
plPading, ''DefPndant's Objections to Order of Dismissal"
could corne before the court for consideration it is clear
that the pleading is beyond the scope permitted by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the trial court erred
in considPring it at all.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN TREATING DEFENDANT'S
PLEADING "DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO ORDER OF
DISMISSAL" AS A MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNDER
RULE 59, U.R.C.P., AND FURTHER ERRED IN SETTING
ASIDE THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL THROUGH ITS SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM DECISION WHICH IN EFFECT GRANTED DEFENDANT A TRIAL IMPROPERLY
UNDER THE GUISE OF RULE 59, U.R.C.P.

Under Rule 7(b) (1), U.R.C.P., it is clear the "D·efendant's Objections to Order of Dismissal" is not a motion and therefore the court erred in treating it as a
motion for a new trial. Further, under Rule 59·( a), U.R.
C.P .. a motion for a new trial must be based upon certain grounds set forth therein. None of these grounds
nrp stated in defendant's pleading and cannot, in the
total absence of such grounds, be read into the pleading
by the court.
The effect of the decision is to grant defendant a
trial without any justification under or basis in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Obviously, since defendant
had not had a trial he is not entitled to move for a new
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trial. ·The action was dismissed for failure to make discovery and defendant had a remedy by appeal which
he failed to pursue. The court cannot act for hiin except
as provided in the Rules of Procedure. The court here
did not undertake to act on its own motion under the
Rules and improperly granted defendant relief under
Rule 5H, U.R.C.P. which he had not lawfully petitioned
for.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER
OF DISMISSAL SINCE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT UNDER RULE 37(b)(2)(iii), U.R.C.P., AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The district court found that the "Defendant's Answers in Response to Order" filed September 6, 1963, did
not provide the information required by the Order dated
July 26, 19,63, under Rule 37, U.R.C.P. (R. 19, 20), and
defendant failed to challenge the court's finding that he
refused to make discovery.
Rule 37(b), U.R.C.P. deals with the consequences of
refusal to make discovery, and with respect to interrogatories served under Rule 33, U.R.C.P. provides:
" . . . Upon refusal of a party to answer any
interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, the
proponent of the question may on like notice make
application for [an Order compelling an answer]."
For failure to comply with an Order compelling an answer Rule 37(b) (2) (iii), U.R.C.P., provides that the court
1nay dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof.
The proper procedure was followed in the instant case.
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J•.taint i I' I' ~Prv<'d interrogatories under Rule 33, U.R.C.P.,
and dt.fendant's answers failed to provide the information calh,d for by the interrogatories. Upon defendant's
l'ailurp to provide the inforn1ation, plaintiff applied to
tlw eonrt for an Order under Rule 37(a), U.R.C.P., which
wa~ issued. Upon defendant's failure to comply with
that order, and after a number of hearings and much
dt>liberation, the court granted an order dismissing the
count<>rclaim.

\Yhile there are no Utah cases construing Rule
:>7 (h) (2) (iii), U.R.C.P., the Rule is taken directly from
the fedPral rulP \Yhich has been construed many times.
In a decision in which the facts are closely analagous to
the instant case, JJlichigan vVindow Cleaning Company v.
Jlarti11o, et al, 173 F.2d 466 (C.A. 6th Cir), the plaintiff
fi lt>d an action for da1nages and served interrogatories on
the deft>ndant. The defendant failed to answer and plaintiff obtained an order from the court requiring defendant
to provide answers to the interrogatories. The answers
made by the defendant were not responsive to the questions and the court then granted additional time. After
furtlwr delays, under Rule 37, default was entered
against defendant for his failure to respond to interrogatoriPs. The court of appeals affirmed the default and
the judgment rendered pursuant thereto, and pointed
out that the defendant had adequate opportunity to
pn,s.ent the required information. The court further
said that defendant's failure to make any attempt to give
adequate and cmnplete answers to the interrogatories left
it ,,·ith no alternative but to enter the order of default.
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Concerning the rights to discovery under Rule 33 the
court said:
"
. [Rule 33] is to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment, for civil trials in the federal
courts no longer need to be carried on in the dark.

* * * * * *
"Much has been left to the discretion of the court,
and in view of the appellant's dilatory and contumacious tactics we are not pursuaded that the
discretion has been abused."
In Milewski v. Schneider Transportation Company,
238 F.2d 39'1 (C.A. Gth Cir.), the plaintiff brought an
action to recover for injuries. Defendant served interrogatories on November 19, 19'54. Extention for answering was stipulated by the parties setting, in succession,
December 23, 19'64, March 8, 1955 and June 7, 19'55 for
the filing of answers. Plaintiff failed to answer and
defendant moved for judgment under Rule 37 (d), Federal Rules of Procedure. The district court entered an
order of dismissal which was affirmed on appeal. The
court of appeals said:
"It appearing that the entry of the order was
authorized under Rule 37 (d), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., and the court being of the
opinion that the District Judge did not abuse
his discretion in doing so (citing cases). The
Judgment is affirmed."
Similarly in Interstate Cigar Company v. Consoliaated Cigar Company, 317 F.2d 744, (C.A. 2nd Cir.), the
plaintiff filed suit and defendant started taking the
deposition of one Spielfogel, a member of plaintiff part-
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nership. II P refused to answer a nmnber of questions
and dt'l'(mdant movP<l for an order compelling answers
undl'r Hule 37 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
rrhe court ordered Spielfogel to answer the questions,
hut he f'ai IP<l to appear at the time and place set for his
dPpo~ ition. Thereafter the defendant moved to dismiss.
Tlw di~trid court dismissed the complaint, and on appeal
the ein·uit court affirmed the decision and said:
"It is too clear for doubt, we believe, that at
least some of the questions Spielfogel was directed to answer were 'relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action.'"
In tlw instant case the question of whether a.n order
of dismis~al under Rule 37, U.R.C.P., should have been
grantPd in the first instance was within the discretion of
tlw district court. However, upon its entry, relief from
the order could onl~, be obtained in the Inanner provided
hy the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The file reflects
tlw defendant's refusal to provide plaintiff with direct
answers and his repeated evasions. The court afforded
defendant adequate opportunity to provide responsive
nn~wers to both plaintiff's interrogatories and the questions which the court ordered defendant to answer under
Rule ~i7(a), U.R.C.P. In its memorandum decision the
court noted that it had held numerous hearings to determine the propriety of the disocvery procedures sought by
plaintiff in the case. (R. 30, 31, 32). The court further
noted that plaintiff was required to produce evidence
disproYing numerous items involved in defendant's
eounterclain1, including evidence taken throughout a full
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day's hearing on the single item defendant claimed had
had the greatest possible merit. The court concluded
that the information was available to defendant, that his
claim was without merit and determined that defendant's
counterclaim should be dismissed under Rule 37 (b) (2)
(iii), U.R.C.P. for defendant's refusal to make discovery.
Thereafter the court signed and entered the order of
dismissal. The file reflects no new or other material
which would challenge or contradict the court's basis
for granting the order of dismissal as shown in its
memorandum decision, although defendant had adequate
opportunity to present any matters he desired. The
defendant merely filed a pleading entitled "Defendant's
Objection to Order of Dismissal." An order of dismissal
under Rule 37 (b) (2) (iii), U.R.C.P., is a final judgment
and is subject to appellate review, and defendant's
remedy was properly a direct appeal from that order.
See 4 Moore, Federal Practice, Section 26.37. There is
no .basis in the record or in law for the action of the
district court in setting aside the order of dismissal and
denying plaintiff's motion to strike "Defendant's Objection to Order of Dismissal." The supplementary memorandum decision entered by the court recites no facts
or basis on which its previous order of dismissal could
be set aside.
CONCL·USION
The decision of the district court setting aside the
order of dismissal and denying plaintiff's motion to
strike should be reversed since under the facts as found
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by the court and applicable law, "Defendant's Objection
to Ord('I' of Dismissal" should not have been heard by the
(•ourt since it is beyond the scope of pleadings permitted
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court further
('tTed when it considered "Defendant's Objection to Order
of Dismissal' as a motion for a new trial and based its
:-;('tting aside of the order of dismissal on the ground that
a motion for a new trial should be granted. Further,
plaintiff is entitled to a dismissal as ordered by the court
undt>r Hule 37(b) (2) (iii), U.R.C.P., and no basis existed
in law or in fact for the action of the district court in
entering a supplementary memorandum decision setting
a:-; i.de the order of dismissal.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN F. PIERCEY
901 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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